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Abstract
ere is a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy
of science – including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others.
I argue here that Herschel’s inuence on Darwin is undeniable. e form of this inuence,
however, is oen misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from
Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell.
On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one would expect were
Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse
on Natural Science.While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and
Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera
causa principle, as well as the role of hypotheses in scientic theory construction. e new
reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the
structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science.
is interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did,
and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed.
Whatever else one might say about Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859a), it has
been claimed time and again that a large part of its impact was methodological. James Lennox (2005,
p. 85), for example, considering the question of whether or not Darwin was an innovator in his eld,
has argued that “if Charles Darwin meets this condition, it is as a philosopher and methodologist.”
Philosophers of science have, therefore, naturally wondered what relationship Darwin’s methodology
might have to the busy climate of nineteenth-century philosophy of science.
Unfortunately, on this point Darwin studies have bequeathed us precious little clarity. We know
that Darwin’s intellectual development and reading was incrediblymulti-faceted (Sloan, 2009;Manier,
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1978), but even this cannot explain the variety of claims we nd regarding Darwin’s relationship to
various philosophers (and philosophies) of science. We learn that Darwin was inuenced by Herschel
(Hodge, 1977; Ruse, 1975), that Darwin was not inuenced by Herschel (Desmond and Moore, 1992;
agard, 1977; Cannon, 1976a,b), that Darwin was inuenced by Whewell (Ruse, 2000, 1978; Curtis,
1987), that Darwin was not inuenced by Whewell (Hodge, 1989, 1991, 2000), or that Darwin was
inuenced by Lyell (Hodge, 1983a,b, 1990, 2009), Comte (Schweber, 1977), or German Romanticism
(Richards, 2002, 2009; Sloan, 2001). Of course, these various claims (or at least the non-contradictory
ones) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It suces to say, however, that the waters in this realm
are rather muddied.
In this essay, I will endeavor to clarify at least one of these relationships – that between Darwin
and Sir John Herschel.e central question, for my purposes here, is this: to what extent did Darwin
absorb and proceed to follow, in the construction of theOrigin, themethodological dictates laid down
by Herschel? I will proceed by focusing on four issues. First, what can we say for certain, historically,
about Darwin’s exposure to Herschel? As it turns out, Darwin (like most other British men of science
in the mid-nineteenth century) read and appreciated Herschel’s work, and we have evidence that
he returned to it in a particularly crucial period during the composition of the theory of natural
selection. Second, what was Herschel’s philosophy of science, at least with regard to the formation
and verication of hypotheses and theories like Darwin’s? My reconstruction will center on the two
of Herschel’s arguments most relevant to Darwin – his discussion of hypotheses, and his elaboration
of the vera causa principle – in particular, his distinction in both these settings between the proposal
and the verication of a hypothesis. Next, can we see any evidence of the use of Herschel’s philosophy
in the Origin or Darwin’s notebooks? I argue that we indeed can, based on a three-part reading of
the Origin related to, but dierent in important ways from, the interpretation oered by Jon Hodge.
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Fourth and nally, we can conrm this new reading of Herschel’s inuence on Darwin via an analysis
of Herschel’s own criticism of Darwin. Herschel published little public critique of Darwin’s theory
(amounting to only a single footnote), but consultation of the marginalia that Herschel wrote in the
copy of the Origin that Darwin sent to him is exceptionally instructive.
1. Darwin’s Exposure to Herschel
In 1831, as Darwin was nishing the residency requirements for his Cambridge degree, he picked up
a copy of John Herschel’s A Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy (Herschel, 1830, hereaer
PD), probably on the advice of his teacher, mentor, and friend, the botanist John Stevens Henslow
(Ruse, 1975, p. 164; Sloan, 2009, p. 27). On the 15th of February, he enthusiastically wrote to his cousin
WilliamDarwin Fox that “If you have not read Herschel in Lardners Cyclo – read it directly” (Darwin,
1831).1 Although we must be cautious to take Darwin’s later reminiscences from his Autobiography
with a healthy serving of salt, he fondly remembered this rst exposure to Herschel’s work:
During my last year at Cambridge I read with care and profound interest Humboldt’s
Personal Narrative.is work and Sir J. Herschel’s Introduction to the Study of Natural
Philosophy [the Preliminary Discourse] stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the
most humble contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science. No one or a dozen
other books inuenced me nearly so much as these two. (Darwin, 1958, pp. 67–68)
Of course, this recollection is consistent with the view that, as Cannon put it, Darwin learned nothing
from Herschel “more complicated than that it would be wonderful to be a scientist” (Cannon, 1976b,
p. 118). For this we must look later.
1. Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse was published as the rst volume in the Cabinet Cyclopædia, edited by Dionysius
Lardner.
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e fall and winter of 1838 was a pivotal time for Darwin.2 He famously read Malthus on the
28th of September, as we see in his D notebook (Darwin, 1838d, D 134–135),3 drawing from him the
important principle of superfecundity – the geometric multiplication of populations, faster than any
possible arithmetic growth in available food and space. A few months later, on the 27th of November,
he rst writes about his twin mechanisms of dierential reproduction and the inheritance of acquired
characters (in his N notebook), which would remain two central elements of his description of
natural selection.4 Only seven pages later, we see the return of a reference to Herschel. Darwin
writes of the mind of man (referring to Herschel’s discussion of Bacon) that “it is (I presume – see
p. 188 of Herschel’s Treatise) a ‘travelling instance’ a – ‘frontier instance’” (Darwin, 1838b, N 49).5
We also nd Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse (again referred to by Darwin as “Herschel’s Introd to
Nat. Philosophy”) on Darwin’s “Books to Read” list – the last written date on the page preceding it is
October 12th of 1838, and across from the entry he notes “2d time of reading” (Darwin, 1838a, 4v).
Only a few weeks aerward, on or just before the 2nd of December, he formulates the “three
principles” grounding natural selection, which will remain the focus of his argument throughout his
writing on evolution:
ree principles will account for all
(1) Grandchildren like grandfathers
(2) Tendency to small change especially with physical change
(3) Great fertility in proportion to support of parents (Darwin, 1838c, E 58)
And, nally, somewhere between the 5th and 16th of December, he compares predatory dogs with
sporting dogs, the initial use of the analogy between articial and natural selection: “If nature had
2. For a more detailed version of this chronology, see Hodge (1983b, 2009), and especially Ospovat (1981).
3. References to Darwin’s notebooks use the now standard lettering and pagination. Quotations from those notebooks,
when they appear, use original spelling and punctuation, and approximate original formatting.
4. “An habitual action must someway aect the brain in a manner which can be transmitted. – this is analogous to a
blacksmith having children with strong arms. –e other principle of those children, which chance? produced with
strong arms, outliving the weaker ones, may be applicable to the formation of instincts, independently of habits”
(Darwin, 1838b, N 42).
5. No date appears on this page; it must be from shortly aer the 27th of November.
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the picking she would make them such a variety far more easily than man, – though man’s practised
judgment even without time can domuch” (Darwin, 1838c, E 63).We thus have all the central elements
of Darwin’s argument in the Origin of Species falling into place over the winter of 1838 – and Darwin
re-reads Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse in the middle of this crucial period.
Lastly, the most direct evidence of Herschel’s impact on Darwin comes from Darwin’s letters.
In a postscript to a letter to George Bentham, written in 1863, Darwin writes:
In fact the belief in natural selection must at present be grounded entirely on general
considerations. (1) on its being a vera causa, from the struggle for existence; & the certain
geological fact that species do somehow change (2) from the analogy of change under
domestication by man’s selection. (3) & chiey from this view connecting under an
intelligible point of view a host of facts. (Darwin, 1863)
At least in this letter, Darwin explicitly states that belief in natural selection is to be bolstered by its
status as a (presumably Herschellian) vera causa.6
It is thus certain that Darwin, in the middle of what was for him a very fertile period of work
on the edgling theory of natural selection, returned to Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse, and he
later cited Herschel’s notion of a vera causa as one of the foremost methodological credentials of
natural selection. Let us consider what exactly Darwin might have found in Herschel’s work.
2. John Herschel’s Philosophy of Science
John Herschel was, without a doubt, one of the most highly regarded gures of nineteenth-century
science in Britain. His tomb at Westminster lies near to Newton’s (and next to Darwin’s), and it
6. As is common in Darwin studies, there is complicating evidence here. In a letter to Hooker, Darwin laments that in
a recent public lecture, Huxley “rates higher than I do the necessity of Natural Selection being shown to be a vera
causa always in action.” He claims, on the contrary, that “I have always looked at this doctrine of Nat. Selection as
an hypothesis, which if it explained several large classes of facts would deserve to be ranked as a theory deserving
acceptance; & this of course is my own opinion” (Darwin, 1860a).agard (1977, p. 356) has argued that this means
that Darwin was not in fact inuenced by Herschel. I believe that this letter should, as I will discuss with regard to the
philosophy of Herschel, be read as emphasizing that the vera causa principle is only a very minimal criterion that any
putative cause must meet. For more information, see the discussion of the vera causa principle in section 2.2.
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is a safe bet that whenever a mid-nineteenth-century author refers to “one of our greatest natural
philosophers,” as Darwin did on the rst page of the Origin (1859a, p. 1), he is referring to Herschel.7
Unfortunately, philosophical scholarship on Herschel is profoundly lacking, and has occurred mainly
obliquely, in relationship to Darwin studies (Ruse, 1975, 1976, 1978, 2000; Schweber, 1985; Recker,
1987; Lennox, 2005; Hull, 2009; Hodge, 1977, 1992) and in the context of several Ph.D. theses (Bolt,
1998; Kavaloski, 1974).8 In addition, a fair bit of work onHerschel has been atly confused, attempting
to read Herschel as a naive Baconian inductivist – even more naive, it is said, than Bacon himself
(e.g., Agassi, 1981).
Marvin Bolt’s characterization of Herschel’s overall project provides us a place to begin. He
notes that “far from being a thorough-going inductivist, John Herschel emphasizes not the process
by which scientic theories arise but rather the manner in which one tests, draws conclusions
from, and evaluates such theories” (Bolt, 1998, p. 41). More precisely, Herschel emphasized the
“careful interplay between the inductive and deductive moments . . . deriving consequences from the
generalizations however derived, either via inductive generalizations, which he advocated, or via
hypothesized theories, which he also encouraged” (Bolt, 1998, p. 47). As Bolt notes (1998, p. 287), such
an acceptance of hypotheses formed a constraint on Herschel’s writing of the Preliminary Discourse:
he wished to support the wave theory of light, which seemed to many of his British readers precisely
the sort of hypothesis that Newton barred us from framing. Let us see, then, what Herschel considered
to be the steps in proposing and evaluating a causal explanation.9
7. For biographical information on Herschel, see Cannon (1961) as well as introductions to reprints of the Preliminary
Discourse (Partridge, 1966; Fine, 1987).
8. Two notable exceptions are Ducasse (1960) and Wilson (1974).
9. All explanation for Herschel is by denition causal: he claims that when we see a new phenomenon, we immediately
look for “its explanation, or reference to an immediate producing cause” (PD §83). I will cite the Preliminary Discourse
(Herschel, 1830) from the text of the rst edition, which Darwin owned (Darwin, 1990), by section number, which is
constant across the various reprints of the Discourse.
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2.1. Hypothesis and Induction
How do we come up with a possible hypothesis in the rst place? About this process, Herschel is
not particularly concerned. We might use Baconian induction, gathering “an enumeration, if not
complete, . . .at least of considerable extent, of [nature’s] materials and combinations” (PD §129),
regulated and made more sophisticated by an extensive list of inductive methods which Herschel
provides us (PD §§145-162). But if such a method is not available, simply arbitrarily proposing a
hypothesis is acceptable. “[W]e must not, therefore, be scrupulous as to how we reach to a knowledge
of such general facts,” Herschel argues, “provided only we verify them carefully when once detected,
we must be content to seize them wherever they are to be found” (PD §170).10
2.2. The Vera Causa Principle
Wemust therefore turn to the verication of a proposed hypothesis or induction. As a rst constraint
on the plausibility of a proposed cause, Herschel, in the tradition ofomas Reid, turns to Newton’s
vera causa principle. Newton, as the rst of his rules for philosophizing, wrote that “no more causes
of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sucient to explain their phenomena”
(Newton, 1999, p. 794). Seizing upon the “true” in this phrase, as many before him had, Herschel
sought to establish a minimal criterion for the plausibility of a putative cause. He introduces the term
thus:
Experience having shown us the manner in which one phenomenon depends on another
in a great variety of cases, we nd ourselves provided, as science extends, with a contin-
ually increasing stock of such antecedent phenomena, or causes (meaning at present
merely proximate causes), competent, under dierent modications, to the production
10. Note that this provides a substantial dierence between the vera causa principle of Herschel and that of Reid. For one
of the “foundation stones” of Reid’s system “was his suspicion of, bordering on contempt for, any theories, hypotheses,
or conjectures which are not induced from experiments and observations” (Laudan, 1981, p. 89).is distinction is
oen missed (e.g., Hodge, 1989, p. 171).
7
of a great multitude of eects, besides those which originally led to a knowledge of them.
To such causes Newton has applied the term verae causae. . . . (PD §138)11
A vera causa is thus one that has, on this denition, been shown (i) to exist, and (ii) to have produced
other phenomena than those which originally led to its proposal. We see the same denition of a
vera causa when Herschel returns again to the subject later in the PD:
[e causal agents in any theory] must be verae causae, in short, which we can not only
show to exist and to act, but the laws of whose action we can derive independently, by
direct induction, from experiments purposely instituted; or at least make such supposi-
tions respecting them as shall not be contrary to our experience, and which will remain
to be veried by the coincidence of the conclusions which we shall deduce from them,
with facts. (PD §209)
Note that this denition, in contrast with the rst, makes Herschel’s insistence on the production
of phenomena other than those the cause was proposed to explain optional – if we cannot reach
such breadth at the outset, we may content ourselves with merely proposing some cause which is
analogous to a known cause and not “contrary to our experience.” We will return to this point later.
is, however, is all Herschel means by a vera causa. In attempting to link Herschel to Darwin,
some writers have overemphasized the notion of a vera causa, claiming that it is somehow the end
result of a successful process of scientic theorizing for Herschel (e.g., Recker, 1987, pp. 161–162;
Hodge, 1992, p. 462; Ruse, 1976, p. 122).is is simply incorrect, as we can see by turning to Herschel’s
examples.12 In section 140, for instance, Herschel considers the possible eects on the Earth’s climate
of a gradual decrease in eccentricity of the orbit of the Earth. He calls the decreasing eccentricity
an “astronomical fact,” and claims that such a decrease would cause a drop in the amount of solar
radiation absorbed by the Earth. He concludes: “We have here, therefore, an evident real cause, of
sucient universality, and acting in the right direction, to account for the phenomenon. Its adequacy
11. For a careful explication of the various senses in which Herschel uses ‘cause’ (and hence an explanation of his reference
in this quote to “proximate causes”), see Cannon (1961).
12. I lack the space here to pursue an interesting and provocative claim by Bolt (1998, pp. 527–528) and Kavaloski (1974)
that, because most of these examples in §§138. are quite similar to those in Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830), we
might have reason to think that a large role was played by Lyell’s Principles in “magnif[ying] the vera causamethod
initially motivated by [Herschel’s] optical work” (Bolt, 1998, p. 527).
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is another consideration” (PD §140, orig. emphasis).is drop in eccentricity is a true cause, but it is
far from a complete or veried explanation – we haven’t even yet determined, for example, whether
it could possibly cause the phenomenon at issue.
Deeming something a vera causa, then, functions for Herschel as a minimal criterion for
continued scientic exploration, and nothing more. As Bolt notes, a given vera causa “may not
be causal for the phenomenon in question, and may not be sucient for the production of that
phenomenon either in terms of its intensity or even in terms of the direction of its action” (Bolt, 1998,
pp. 383–384). Indeed, Herschel at one point describes our probability of success in the ascription
of true causes almost as though we were merely checking our known verae causae against the facts
at issue: this success will depend on “the number and variety of causes experience has placed at
our disposal,” “our habit of applying them to the explanation of natural phenomena,” and “on the
number of analogous phenomena we can collect, which have either been explained, or which admit
of explanation by some one or other of those causes” (PD §141). It is thus clear that the establishment
of a vera causa is only a rst step toward a complete scientic explanation.
What about Herschel’s famed relationship to the concept of analogy?When elaborating the
connection between Darwin and Herschel, the latter is oen sloganized as focusing only on the
importance of analogies for scientic explanation (Ruse, 1975, 1978, 2000). Analogies are clearly
important in the development of a hypothesis for Herschel. Aer all, the use of the vera causa
principle requires us to determine whether or not the causes in any given instance may be analogous
to some other, already known, vera causa, and our successfully nding a cause in some particular
circumstance depends, as just quoted, on the “analogous instances” we have at our disposal. Ruse,
for example, stops the argument at this point, claiming that “the key to a vera causa was an analogy”
(1978, p. 324), and that analogy, in turn, is the key to understanding the relationship between Darwin
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and Herschel. But it should be clear from the preceding discussion, quick though it was, that this is
to substantially shortchange Herschel’s philosophy of science. For the vera causa principle functions
as a sort of check on wild speculation (and nothing more). As Wilson notes, “analogies were valuable
when true causes were manifestly beyond reach” (1974, p. 94). Or, to quote a longer passage from
Bolt,
analogous instances played an important role for the production of hypotheses, but the
fertility of an hypothesis – the ability of an hypothesis to predict and to apply to novel
phenomena – as well as the consilience of an hypothesis – the ability of an hypothesis to
embrace or to explain a wide-ranging set of phenomena – provided warrant not only for
the hypothesis in question but for the very method of invoking hypotheses. (Bolt, 1998,
p. 405)
Analogy therefore features in this step just described, where we propose and evaluate the basic
suitability of a hypothesis. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination, the linchpin of Herschel’s
philosophy of science.
2.3. Veri®cation: Adequacy
How, then, are we to test a hypothesis, having deemed it to satisfy the vera causa criterion? Our rst
step in verication is quite simple. Herschel writes:
Whenever, therefore, we think we have been led by induction to the knowledge of the
proximate cause of a phenomenon . . . our next business is to examine deliberately and
seriatim all the cases we have collected of its occurrence, in order to satisfy ourselves
that they are explicable by our cause. . . . (PD §172)
is is the notion of “adequacy” referred to by Herschel in the eccentricity example. Having a
legitimate possible explanation – a vera causa – we must now turn to see whether or not the cause
at issue could possibly produce the phenomena which we have proposed it to explain.is is the
rst step in the verication of an induction or a hypothesis. If it fails this test, it clearly cannot be the
proper explanation.
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We see here an instance of Bolt’s apt depiction of Herschel as constantly alternating between the
“inductive” and “deductive” modes of theory construction. Despite Bacon’s having tarred overreliance
on induction as one of the “idols,” a hypothesis was, or at least could have been, initially formulated
by inductive means. Herschel believes he has justied this use of induction, by a combination of
his vera causa principle and his rules for inductive method.e next step, then, is to turn to the
deductive mode, and attempt to derive from this new hypothesis the desired consequences.
2.4. Veri®cation: Consilience
Further, our deduction of consequences must not stop at those phenomena we initially sought to
explain, for
a law of nature has not that degree of generality which ts it for a stepping-stone to
greater inductions, unless it be universal in its application. [ . . . ] [O]ur next step in the
verication of an induction must therefore consist in extending its application to cases
not originally contemplated: in studiously varying the circumstances under which our
causes act, with a view to ascertain whether their eect is general; and in pushing the
application of our laws to extreme cases. (PD §176)
Universality is evidently an essential requirement for novel causes in Herschel’s philosophy. It is
worthy of note that Darwin scored the margin next to this passage in his copy of the Preliminary
Discourse, one of only a handful of passages which he annotated (Darwin, 1990).
More than simple universality, however, this sounds much like the concept of consilience,
which deserves more explication here. Consilience is a notion almost always attributed to William
Whewell, who coined the term in the second volume of his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (rst
published in 1840). He writes there that
the evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more forcible character
when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind dierent from those which
were contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis. . . . I will take the liberty of
describing [this] by a particular phrase; and will term it the Consilience of Inductions. . . .
(Whewell, 1847, p. 65)
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oughHerschel does not applyWhewell’s term (as he could not,Whewell’s work not being published
until a decade aer his),13 he clearly has an idea much like consilience in mind – both in his rst
denition of a vera causa, when he mandates that we know a cause in ways “besides those which
originally led to a knowledge of them” (PD §138), and later, at this second step in the verication of a
hypothesis. While I have no wish to pursue the priority claim here, noting the existence of consilience
in Herschel will prove important when we come to evaluating his relationship to Darwin.
We can thus recap our observations regarding Herschel’s view of the proposal and verication
of a hypothesis. We begin with (1) hypotheses derived either by enumerative inductions or arbitrary
proposition.e basic criterion of acceptability for hypotheses is that they (2) be grounded in verae
causae, which, for Herschel, means that the causes in a given explanation either are or are analogous
to causes which are known to exist. Now, how do we verify our putative hypothesis? We initially (3)
ensure that the cause at issue is adequate to the production of the phenomena at issue – that is, that
the cause could be responsible for the phenomena it was proposed to explain. Finally, we expand our
search, via (4) consilience of this hypothesis with other and surprising data. If we have survived all
these tests, we have produced a genuinely acceptable scientic explanation, by Herschel’s lights.
An interesting allied question arises here: is Herschel’s depiction of this process intended to be
normative, or merely descriptive of how good science is in fact performed?14 For if Herschel’s project
is merely descriptive, then alignment between Herschel’s edicts and Darwin’s project is unsurprising
– Herschel is describing how good science is done, and Darwin is doing good science. It is clear,
however, that Herschel does indeed intend his depictions of the scientic process to be prescriptive.
To begin, the very method of science itself provides a normative check on the mind’s “tendency to
13. Bolt cites a similar peculiarity in priority of discovery, noting that all of “Mill’s Methods” are present in Herschel’s
Preliminary Discourse, again published some 13 years before Mill’s System of Logic. Bolt proposes that we re-christen
them “Herschel’s Habits” (1998, p. 398).
14. Many thanks to José Díez and Hasok Chang for raising this worry.
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rush at once upon its object, to undervalue the means in over-estimation of the end, and while gazing
too intently at the goal which alone it has been accustomed to desire, to lose sight of the richness and
variety of the prospects that oer themselves on either hand on the road” (PD §9). Further, while
Herschel certainly believes that he is drawing on the inductive evidence of history to produce his
rules for scientic reasoning, these rules nonetheless have a normative character. As he puts the
matter when summarizing the next section of the work to come:
We shall state the helps which may be aorded us, in a work of so much thought and
labour, by a methodical course of proceeding, and by a careful notice of those means
which have at any time been found successful, with a view to their better understanding
and adaptation to other cases: a species of mental induction of nomean utility and extent
in itself; inasmuch as by pursuing it alone can we attain a more intimate knowledge than
we actually possess of the laws which regulate our study of truth, and of the rules, so far
as they extend, to which invention is reducible. (PD §108)
e “helps” to reasoning to which we may have recourse as we study the sciences, that is, have not
only been historically successful (as Herschel will illustrate with manifold examples throughout the
work), but careful study of them is the only way in which we will be able to improve our knowledge
of causes and laws in the natural world.
If these are Herschel’s methodological maxims, what are we to say about their application to
Darwin’s work? We must begin by considering the structure of Darwin’s argument.
3. Darwin’s Argument in the Origin
Darwin famously claimed that the Origin constituted “one long argument” (1859a, p. 459), and there
have been several attempts to clarify what wemight consider to be the structure of this long argument.
Let us review a few of these in turn, proceeding in order of increasing methodological sophistication.
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3.1. The Hypothetico-Deductive Model
Wemay begin with the claim that the Origin is a hypothetico-deductive theory, in the Hempelian
sense – that Darwin intended to postulate “laws of nature” grounded on an inductive basis of
phenomena, nally deriving predictions from these by logical deduction (Ruse, 1971, 1975; Schweber,
1985; Sober, 1985). On this reading, Darwin begins by taking the “inductive data” he collected on
articial breeding and during his voyage on the Beagle, then infers the “laws” of dierential tness,
Malthusian superfecundity, and so forth (in chapters 1–3 of the Origin). He next attempts to derive
from these laws both the claim that natural selection must occur (chapter 4), and further conclusions
for other branches of the sciences (chapters 10–13).
Assertions of this structure for the Origin are oen linked to Newton, whose mechanics is
supposedly the foremost instance of a hypothetico-deductive theory. Ruse, for example, argues that
Darwin fully accepted “Newtonian astronomy as the paradigm for science,” and that “his aim was to
be the Newton of biology” (1975, p. 166). He therefore consciously structured his theory in accordance
with the hypothetico-deductive ideal.
Two considerations argue very strongly against this picture of Darwin’s theorizing. First, the
philosophical suitability of this model for looking at the Origin is questionable from the start. As
Recker argues (1987, p. 151), any application of the hypothetico-deductive model to Darwin’s case
will be necessarily sketchy, as Darwin lacked any understanding of the mechanism of heredity, some-
thing which ought to constitute some of the most fundamental axioms of a hypothetico-deductive
presentation of natural selection.15 Further, Darwin himself argues that natural selection has not
15. Darwin’s theory of pangenesis was probably worked out relatively early (Sloan, 1985, 1986; Hodge, 1985), but he clearly
saw no need to argue for this theory in the Origin – it was not published until nine years later ine Variation of
Animals and Plants under Domestication.
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been proven in chapter 4 (the location of its supposed hypothetico-deductive derivation), but rather
that “[w]hether natural selection has really thus acted in nature . . . must be judged of by the general
tenour and balance of evidence given in the following chapters” (Darwin, 1859a, p. 127).16
Secondly, there exists a compelling historical reason to reject the hypothetico-deductive reading
of the Origin. Darwin, at one point in his notebooks, does indeed consider a project which would
have had such a structure, and then abandons it. Hodge writes about it at length:
e structure of this prospective project was taken directly from the precedent set by the
customary interpretation of the most prestigious physical science of the day: Newtonian
celestial mechanics.is science was seen to have a threefold pyramidal structure. At
the base were particular astronomical observations. . . . In the next level up were lawful
generalisations about these motions. . . .ese were descriptive not causal laws. Finally,
at the top level there are causes: the lawful causes, the lawful forces of gravitation and
inertia. . . . Darwin’s promissory project was to have such a threefold structuring. (Hodge,
2009, p. 54)
Such an undertaking, then, would clearly have had a hypothetico-deductive structure, modeled as it
was on explicitlyNewtonian precedents. Asmentioned, however,Darwin never completed this project.
Natural selection, Hodge writes, “although arising from the lawful tendencies of heredity, variation,
and superfecundity . . . was never seen by Darwin to have a law of its own. . . . Such considerations
may have ended Darwin’s aim of emulating the Newtonian consummation of Kepler’s nomic legacy”
(Hodge, 2009, p. 68).17We can thus demonstrate that Darwin dabbled in the hypothetico-deductive
method and promptly proceeded to abandon it. It seems that we should as well.
16. See the similar and related arguments in Sloan (1986) and Hodge (1991). For more general considerations of the
structure of the Origin, see Hodge and Kohn (1985).
17. Notably, in one of the rst negative reviews of the Origin, Sedgwick indicts Darwin for having failed to follow the
hypothetico-deductive method. “I must in the rst place,” he writes, “observe that Darwin’s theory is not inductive, –
not based on a series of acknowledged facts pointing to a general conclusion, – not a proposition evolved out of the
facts, logically, and of course including them” (Sedgwick, 1860, p. 285, orig. emphasis). Darwin’s contemporaries,
therefore, did not believe that his theory was structured as a generalization from an inductive base of observed facts –
and believed that the theory was so much the worse o for this failing.
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3.2. An Analogy and a Consilience
Another reading has viewed Darwin as straightforwardly synthesizing two of his philosophical
colleagues. Herschel, as noted in the last section, has occasionally been glossed as concerned above
all with analogies.e traditional slogan for Whewell, on the other hand, is that he stands concerned
rst and foremost with the “consilience of inductions” – the demonstration that many disparate lines
of evidence may be unied under a single putative cause (Recker, 1987; Ruse, 1978). We can nd both
an analogy (with articial selection, in chapters 1–4) and a consilience (across many areas of science,
in chapters 10–13) in the Origin, and here we have an explanation for the structure of its argument.18
Ruse even goes so far as to claim that “the important thing is that Darwin, covering his options,
wrote into his evolutionary theory both a Herschellian analogical vera causa and a [Whewellian]
consilience” (1978, p. 328).
is interpretation seems unsatisfactory as well. First of all, there is the implication that these
are somehow two “separate” arguments for natural selection – as if we establish natural selection’s
bona des twice, once by Herschel’s criteria and once by Whewell’s. We have already noted, however,
that Darwin does not consider the argument for natural selection concluded at the end of chapter 4 –
we must rather consider the rest of the evidence for and against Darwin’s proposal that comes in the
remainder of the volume.
Second, it seems that Herschel and Whewell’s criteria for verae causae are at least occasionally
contradictory, and thus it would be challenging (to say the least) to hold one’s theory to both.Whewell
writes at length against Herschel’s use of analogy, claiming that if all we want from a vera causa is
18. In this connection, Ruse (1975, p. 162) has oddly claimed that Herschel and Whewell “diered little, if at all, with
respect to ‘methodological’ questions.” Nothing seems to me to be further from the truth. For more information on
the analogy in the rst chapters of the Origin, see Sterrett (2002) and Largent (2009).
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“close similarity with some known kind of cause,” then “[n]o forces, or virtues, or sympathies, or
uids, or ethers, would be excluded by this interpretation of verae causae. Least of all, would such an
interpretation reject the Cartesian hypothesis of vortices; which undoubtedly, as I conceive, Newton
intended to condemn” by his rst rule of philosophizing (Whewell, 1847, p. 283).us, Whewell’s
method would (at least on his own reading) disqualify Darwin’s Herschellian analogy.
Next, this analysis seems to shortchange both Herschel and Whewell. To reduce Herschel to
the single concept of “analogy,” as was argued in the last section, is to choose only one (and one
relatively unimportant, at that) of Herschel’s criteria for the proposal and verication of a hypothesis.
ough I lack the space to pursue the claim fully, the same is true with the reduction of Whewell to
“consilience.” Whewell’s neo-Kantian inclination, for example, is by now well known, and this side of
Whewell’s version of Newtonianism is entirely misrepresented by such an interpretation.19
Finally, and most importantly, we have a problem of anachronism here.e argumentative
structure of the Origin laid down by Darwin in the E and N notebooks over the course of late 1838
would remain relatively constant throughout the Essay, the Sketch, and the Origin, and Whewell
coined his notion of consilience in his Philosophy, which was not published until 1840.20 Let us turn
to a more fruitful analysis of the Origin, one which is directly tied to a view of Darwin’s relationship
to Herschel.
19. Wilson (1974, pp. 80–83) presents the case quickly and straightforwardly. See also Ducasse (1960, p. 180).
20. To my knowledge, the only relevant Whewell materials which predate the bulk of the construction of Darwin’s
argument are his reviews of Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse, and the rst two volumes of Lyell’s Principles of Geology
(Whewell, 1831b,a, 1832), neither of which mention consilience.
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4. The Relationship between Darwin and Herschel
In a remarkable series of papers, Jon Hodge (1977; 1983a; 1987; 1989; 1992; 2000; 2009) has argued in
great detail for a tripartite reading of the Origin, and has garnered the agreement of a sizable portion
of the Darwin studies community (e.g., Lennox, 2005; Lewens, 2009; Waters, 2009; Hull, 2009).
Importantly for our purposes, his view of the Origin is premised on Herschel’s vera causa principle.
Let us begin with his reading of Darwin.
4.1. Hodge on Darwin
Hodge describes the overarching argumentative structure of the Origin as follows, explicitly connect-
ing it to the philosophy of Herschel and related concepts in Lyell:
[W]e can see in Herschel’s and Lyell’s upholding of the [vera causa principle] the source
for Darwin’s taking up, in the Sketch, the following in turn: (i) the case for the existence
of natural selection; (ii) the case for its competence to produce new species; and (iii)
the case for its having been responsible for the production of extant and extinct species.
(Hodge, 1977, p. 239)21
How do these three phases work in Darwin’s thought, and to which parts of the argument in the
Origin do they correspond?
First, the existence phase.is consists of the analogy in the Origin’s chapters one through
three. We know that the selective modication of species by articial breeding is incredibly eective –
this is a cause which we know to exist. Further, we can locate three features in the natural world –
hereditary variation, dierential reproduction, and the Malthusian pressure on population – which
are sucient to instantiate a similar selective breeding process in the wild.us, natural selection
exists.
21. Precisely the same division is clearly expressed in Hodge (1992).
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Second, the primary portion of the adequacy case comes in chapter four of the Origin, where
Darwin argues that this selective breeding process, which is insucient as applied in articial
selection to create new species, will be sucient, given the much more extensive time which natural
selection has to work and the precision with which it can act, to produce new species which breed
true.en, chapters ve through eight attempt to undercut obvious objections to this adequacy
thesis.
ird and nally, chapters nine through thirteen of the Origin constitute what Hodge calls the
responsibility phase, arguing that “natural selection . . . is more probable, and so is to be preferred over
any rival theory because it is better than any other at explaining several kinds or classes of facts about
those species: biogeographical facts, embryological facts and so on” (Hodge, 1992, p. 463). Darwin’s
aim in these sections, according to Hodge, is to make the case for natural selection having been the
agent actually operative in the historical production of species on the Earth.
Hodge cites much evidence in support of this reading of the Origin, far more than I could
do justice to here.is explanation makes sense of Darwin’s early work in his notebooks prior to
the development of natural selection (Hodge, 1983b), it explains Darwin’s re-reading of Herschel in
late 1838 (Hodge, 1983a), it can help us understand Darwin’s growing focus on his young theory as
“publishable, public science” (Hodge, 2009, p. 59), and it can help explain Darwin’s methodological
or philosophical enthusiasm for Lyell (Hodge, 1987; Hull, 1983). All these positive cases, I agree, are
quite valid.
However, Hodge mistakes Darwin’s motivations, especially in the “responsibility” phase of
the argument – and this misunderstanding is due to a small, but signicant misreading of Herschel.
Let us look, then, at Hodge’s view of the connection between these three phases of argument and
Herschel’s work.
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4.2. Hodge on Herschel
Hodge, throughout his reading of Herschel, remains focused on the vera causa principle. Darwin’s
three phases of argumentation, insofar as they are traceable toHerschel, are supposed to derive entirely
from a straightforward explication of Herschel’s use of verae causae. Hodge writes that “we may take
the whole [vera causa] rule or principle to specify the following: in explaining any phenomenon,
one should invoke only causes whose existence and competence [or adequacy] to produce such an
eect can be known independently of their putative responsibility for that phenomenon” (Hodge,
1992, p. 239).22
ese three phases are thus, on Hodge’s reading of Herschel, elements of what it is to claim
that something is a vera causa. Put dierently, Darwin’s goal – what he has taken from his reading of
Herschel – is to establish that natural selection is a vera causa.us he must establish its existence,
adequacy, and responsibility. Based on the presentation of Herschel in section 2, I am quite doubtful
that this is an accurate reading of Herschel’s methodological prescriptions. First, as has already
been discussed at length in section 2.2, the vera causa principle does not constitute a goal or end of
scientic theorizing for Herschel. On the contrary, it is a very early and very low bar that any putative
explanation must clear.
Second, even if this were the role of the vera causa principle, this three-part structure is an
inadequate reading of what Herschel means by a vera causa. To begin, we know from Herschel’s
example of the declining eccentricity of the Earth’s orbit that adequacy is an issue entirely orthogonal
to whether or not a cause is a vera causa. Herschel, recall, writes of this drop in eccentricity that
22. Hodge (1977, 1989) also gives, along with this three-part reading of the Origin, a two-part reading: rst, “natural
selection established as [vera causa principle] cause for species” in chapters 1–3, and then “natural selection as, on
balance, probably responsible for species” in the rest of the book (Hodge, 1977, p. 243).is collapses the “existence”
and “adequacy” phases into one “vera causa” phase. My arguments will apply equally well, in general, to either of
these readings.
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“[w]e have, therefore, an evident real cause, of sucient universality, and acting in the right direction,
to account for the phenomenon. Its adequacy is another question” (PD §140, orig. emphasis).
ird and nally, responsibility in Hodge’s sense is not a necessary requirement for the postula-
tion of a hypothetical cause in Herschel’s philosophy.is responsibility requirement might come
from the rst denition of vera causa in PD §138, where Herschel writes that such a cause is “compe-
tent, under dierent modications, to the production of a great multitude of eects, besides those
which originally led to a knowledge of them” (emph. added). But Herschel’s account of explanation, as
we have seen it worked out in his examples, is less strict than the emphasized portion of this quote
might lead us to believe. We must have, eventually, this sort of “consilience” in order to possess a
genuine causal explanation – it is one of the later steps in the verication of causal explanations in
Herschel’s system (and Darwin did believe he could demonstrate it, about which more later). But
we need not have this sort of consilience when we propose a given causal agent. As noted above,
Herschel says in his later, second denition of a true cause that a new proposed cause must be one
either “the laws of whose action we can derive independently” or “at least make such suppositions
respecting them as shall not be contrary to our experience, and which will remain to be veried
by the coincidence of the conclusions we shall deduce from them, with facts” (PD §209).e rst
of these two possibilities corresponds to Hodge’s responsibility and Herschel’s statement from PD
§138.e second, I argue, is not only dierent, but is the sense in which Darwin intended to propose
natural selection when he initially engages with the vera causa principle.
Hodge therefore seems to slightly, yet signicantly, misread Herschel. As I argued above,
however, his tripartite reading of the Origin seems correct. Let us now try to combine Hodge’s
reading of Darwin with the elucidation of Herschel above, constructing a better view of the mark
Herschel’s philosophy le upon Darwin.
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4.3. A New Reading of Herschel and Darwin
We can, I believe, protably build a “Herschellian” reading of the Origin based on Hodge’s three-part
analysis of Darwin’s argument and a cautious picture of Herschel’s philosophy of science.
First, consider the analogy between articial and natural selection in the Origin’s rst three
chapters, or what Hodge calls the “existence” phase.is, as I have shown, corresponds quite precisely
to Herschel’s narrowly-drawn vera causa principle. Darwin is attempting to show here that natural
selection is worthy of further study – that it is a vera causa. As I have argued extensively, this is, for
Herschel, a necessary condition that an explanatory hypothesis must pass “to qualify it for a vera
causa available in sound philosophy” (PD §138) – and nothing more. Once we have such a cause, we
can add it to the list of those that “experience has placed at our disposal” (PD §141).
His argument proceeds as we would expect, according to Herschel’s instruction in the Prelimi-
nary Discourse.He collects “analogous instances” from pigeon, dog, and horse breeding, as well as
the “unconscious selection” of “the lowest savages” (Darwin, 1859a, p. 34). He attempts to bolster the
analogy by as many means as he has available to him: as Sterrett argues (2002), he draws an analogy
between “methodical selection” and the principle of divergence, as well as a separate analogy between
“unconscious selection” and the principle of extinction. Knowing full well that natural selection
could not, in his day, be directly observed, he was forced to avail himself of Herschel’s secondary
reliance on hypothesis and analogy. Indeed, Herschel argued at one point that “[i]f the analogy of
two phenomena be very close and striking, while, at the same time, the cause of one is very obvious,
it becomes scarcely possible to refuse to admit the action of an analogous cause in the other, though
not so obvious in itself ” (PD §142). Darwin seemed to earnestly desire to present this forceful an
analogy as the Origin’s opening argumentative move. Whatever one might go on to say about the
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adequacy of natural selection or its ability to explain a broad base of biological facts, Darwin did not
want it to seem as fanciful as an ether, or the notion of “progress” present in Chambers’s Vestiges of
the Natural History of Creation (Schwartz, 1990).
Now, as Herschel tells us, “its adequacy is another question” (PD §140). Making the adequacy
case is the goal of the fourth through ninth chapters.23 ContraHodge, however, this is not part of
establishing something as a vera causa (Darwin has already completed that task), but rather the
rst step in the verication of Darwin’s hypothesis. We thus have a separation between chapters
three and four. By the end of chapter three, Darwin has provided enough evidence to demonstrate
that natural selection is a legitimate hypothesis with which we are permitted to work. Next, Darwin
turns to the verication of the hypothesis as proposed. Kavaloski, though he only elaborates on this
claim very minimally, agrees, arguing that the rst chapters are “primarily interested in establishing
the elements of his theory . . . as verae causae,” and the rest is “the empirical testing of the theory”
(Kavaloski, 1974, pp. 122–123).
us, Darwin must next argue that natural selection operates both in the right direction and
with suitable intensity to have been able to produce the array of species which we now nd.e
goal, that is, is to establish that natural selection could in fact have produced the phenomena that it
was proposed to explain.is is exactly how Darwin proceeds in the fourth through ninth chapters,
discussing rst the conditions under which natural selection might have produced species, genera,
families, and so forth, via the working of the principle of the divergence of character, the ways in
which variation may be expected to act, and then subverting possible objections to its adequacy
from the evolution of highly specialized organs, instinct, hybrids, and the geological record, among
23. Here lies a near-agreement with Hodge, who claims the same thing about chapters four through eight. I think that the
ninth chapter on geological diculties belongs better to this adequacy case than with those that come aer it. Bowler
(1996, p. 122) makes the same case.
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others. Again, we see in this phase of Darwin’s argument exactly what we would expect by Herschel’s
lights: having justied natural selection as a vera causa, he proceeds to Herschel’s rst step in the
verication of a hypothesis, and establishes its adequacy.
Finally, the tenth through thirteenth chapters clearly constitute a consilience – but not, as
several have argued, aWhewellian consilience (on pain of anachronism), nor, as in Hodge, the sort of
consilience (or “responsibility”) that sometimes might justify a vera causa. Rather, this is, as Herschel
argues, the natural next step in the verication of a hypothesis once it has been successfully proposed
and proven adequate to the phenomena at issue. “[C]ases not originally contemplated” (PD §176), as
Herschel describes them, are precisely the subject-matter of this last portion of the Origin, in marked
and notable contrast to the earlier argument for natural selection’s adequacy. Darwin moves here
to areas as diverse as geology, biogeography, classication, morphology, and embryology. By the
eleventh chapter, Darwin already feels condent to say that “[h]e who rejects [the claim that each
species was created at only a single point on the globe], rejects the vera causa of ordinary generation
with subsequent migration, and calls in the agency of a miracle” (Darwin, 1859a, p. 352).24
Wecan see as well an echo of a piece of advice fromHerschel whichwe have not yet had occasion
to discuss. Herschel argues (again, presaging Whewell) that we should search for conrmations of a
theory “among instances of that very kind which were at rst considered hostile to [it]” (PD §180).
Ruse (1975, 2000) and Hull (2009) have noted that this explains several of Darwin’s comments to the
eect that his explanation of embryology was the most signicant of all his evidence – “my pet bit in
my book,” as he once referred to it (Darwin, 1859b). It should indeed be seen as weighty, on Herschel’s
criterion: embryology, as it was oen understood in Darwin’s day (with focus on the progression
24. To anticipate our later discussion of Herschel’s response to Darwin, in his own copy of the Origin,Herschel scores
this passage in the margin and unhappily marks it with a large X.
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inherent in development), would more naturally be read as favoring a Lamarckian view of species
transformation as opposed to a Darwinian one.25
5. Herschel’s Response to Darwin
We nowmust turn to Herschel’s own response to Darwin’s work. Privately, as is oen quoted, Darwin
wrote to Charles Lyell (some two weeks aer the publication of the Origin) that
I have heard by round about channel that Herschel says my Book “is the law of higgledy-
pigglety”.—What this exactlymeans I do not know, but it is evidently very contemptuous.—
If true this is great blow & discouragement. (Darwin, 1859c)
Darwin speaks of very few other criticisms of his work in these sorts of terms – he was clearly deeply
stung by Herschel’s rejection. We lack sucient meat here, however, to see why Herschel would have
objected to Darwin’s argument.
Publicly, Herschel’s criticism was limited to a single footnote to the book-length version of
his Encyclopedia Britannica article on “Physical Geography” (1861). Bolt helpfully teases out two
arguments here. First is Herschel’s claim that
We can no more accept the principle of arbitrary and casual variation and natural
selection as a sucient account, per se, of the past and present organic world, than we
can receive the Laputan method of composing books (pushed a l’outrance) as a sucient
one of Shakspeare [sic] and the Principia. Equally in either case, an intelligence, guided
by a purpose, must be continually in action to bias the directions of the steps of change –
to regulate their amount – to limit their divergence – and to continue them in a denite
course.We do not believe thatMr. Darwinmeans to deny the necessity of such intelligent
direction. (Herschel, 1861, §11, nn.)
As Bolt rightly notes (1998, pp. 591–592), this is a minor correction.at is, Herschel does not here
object to the form of natural selection qua law or secondary cause, but rather to the fact that Darwin
has failed to emphasize that the acting out of this law still requires the active intervention of a higher
25. See, for example, the presentation of the developmental context to early Darwinian theory in Sloan (1986).
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power.26
Herschel’s footnote continues, however, and the second half strikes right at our discussion so
far:
But [intelligent direction] does not, so far as we can see, enter into the formula of his law,
and without it we are unable to conceive how the law can have led to the results. On the
other hand, we do not mean to deny that such intelligence may act according to a law
(that is to say, on a preconceived and denite plan). Such a law, stated in words, would
be no other than the actual observed law of organic succession; or one more general,
taking that form when applied to our own planet, and including all the links of the chain
which have disappeared. But the one law is a necessary supplement to the other, and
ought, in all logical propriety, to form a part of its enunciation. Granting this, and with
some demur as to the genesis of man, we are far from disposed to repudiate the view
taken of this mysterious subject in Mr. Darwin’s work. (Note added Jan. 1861) (Herschel,
1861, §11, nn.)
e objection here seems to be that while Darwin might well have oered a vera causa – a cause that
is indeed acting and has aected the history of life – he has failed to oer a sucient adequacy case.
In Bolt’s words, “only such a full account [of evolution], which includes the laws of variations and
the causal mechanisms that give rise to them, merits the label of a theory, and even at the level of
the laws of variation and succession Darwin’s account fails to meet Herschel’s criteria” (Bolt, 1998,
pp. 593–594).
is is, however, still a fairly sketchy complaint couched in a vague footnote. Even Bolt’s
extrapolation that Herschel is concerned with laws of variation (however Herschel intends the “actual
observed law of organic succession; or one more general”) is dicult to support on this thin amount
of textual evidence.
26. Darwin believed this to be an exceptionally unfair criticism, leveled at him as it was by a variety of commentators,
including perhaps most forcefully Sedgwick. In a letter to Henslow, he wonders “whether it was not allowable (& a
great step) to invent the undulatory theory of Light—ie hypothetical undulations in a hypothetical substance the
ether. And if this be so, why may I not invent hypothesis of natural selection . . . & try whether this hypothesis of
natural selection does not explain (as I think it does) a large number of facts” (Darwin, 1860b). If the wave theory of
light required no reference to a creator, and violated none of the canons of sound inductive reasoning, why, Darwin
protests, does natural selection?
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Clarity may be gained by turning to Herschel’s ownmarginalia to his copy of theOrigin, sent to
him by Darwin.27 Herschel marked up the volume fairly extensively, concerned more than anything,
it seems, with locating places where Darwin’s exposition appears to contradict itself.
In the rst few chapters of the Origin, we see Herschel concerned with the worry that would
make up his rst argument – the location of the active power driving natural selection. In chapter
one, Herschel underlines Darwin’s claim that “nature gives successive variations;man adds them up
in certain directions useful to him. In this sense hemay be said tomake for himself useful breeds”
(p. 30).28 In the fourth chapter, he marks many instances of Darwin’s attribution of activity to nature
itself: “She can act on every internal organ” (p. 83), “Man selects only for his own good; Nature
only for that of the being which she tends” (p. 83), “should plainly bear the stamp of far higher
workmanship?” (p. 84), all of these passages marked with a ‘C’ in the margin that appears to be
Herschel’s code for ‘contradiction.’
In the h chapter, then, we see Herschel’s more substantive complaint, in an annotation below
the last paragraph of the chapter on page 170:
D. recognizes an unknown cause of slight individual dierences – but claims for “natural
selection” the character of a “sucient theory” in regard to the results of those dierences.
In the nal paragraph of the chapter, just above, Herschel has underlined Darwin’s claim that “a cause
for each [variation]must exist,” setting it against the double-underlined claim that natural selection
“gives rise to all the more important modications of structure.” Which is it, Herschel seems to ask –
the causal production of the variations or natural selection – that holds primary responsibility for the
observed outcomes? And if the correct answer is “both,” then how can we leave the cause of variation
unknown?
27. Inscribed “From the Author” on the rst page.e volume is now present in the Herschel Family Archive at the Harry
Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin. My thanks to Stephen R. Case for providing these marginalia, which I
have edited and released in the public domain at https://github.com/cpence/herschel-origin-marginalia.
28. Herschel’s single underlines are indicated by italics; double-underlines by bold italics.
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Here, I think, we see very clearly the substance of Herschel’s objection. In the pivotal h
chapter, Darwin has turned to the causes and character of variation, so important for his defense of
the adequacy of natural selection. Herschel, quite simply, rejects the idea that any theory of organic
change could possibly be adequate – that the theory could be believed to have produced the observed
phenomena – without a description of how the actual process of variation could have produced the
history of life.29 And to emphasize the point, this critique occurs at exactly the point in the Origin
where we would expect it on the reading developed here: Herschel objects to Darwin’s claim of
adequacy for natural selection during the exposition of the evidence for that very adequacy claim.30
As an aside, several authors have argued thatHerschel’s primary objection toDarwin concerned
the rejection of design. Ruse, for instance, writes that “[Herschel and Whewell] both felt that Darwin
had failed to do what any good biological theoristmust do, pay adequate recognition to the role of
God’s Design in the formation of organisms” (Ruse, 1975, p. 180).31 While we have seen that a part of
Herschel’s critique is directed at the absence of active design fromDarwin’s picture, we’ve seen equally
well that this is the minor, less important of Herschel’s two complaints. Far more signicant (both
to Herschel and scientically) is his worry about the adequacy case and the absence of a sucient
explanation of variation.
29. Notably, Bolt’s extrapolation has it exactly right, in spite of the fact that he did not, according to the list in the appendix
to his work, consult Herschel’s copy of the Origin.
30. Note as well that this must be a rejection of the adequacy claim, not the vera causa claim, as the vera causa principle,
as we have seen above, is meant to be a check on wildly speculative causes, while nothing in the tone of Herschel’s
objections here seems to indicate that he believes that Darwin is engaging in undue speculation.
31.e same narrative appears in Hull (2009, pp. 186–188).
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6. Conclusions
is, then, is the appropriate way to view the inuence of Herschel’s methodology on Darwin. In
taking Hodge’s tripartite reading of the Origin, we retain all its advantages, particularly a deeply
contextualized reading of the Origin’s development, with connections to Darwin’s work in the
notebooks and the early Essay and Sketch. But as I have argued above, Hodge founds this tripartite
structure for the Origin on a misreading of Herschel’s philosophy, overemphasizing Herschel’s use of
the vera causa principle and eliding over the distinction Herschel draws between the proposal of a
hypothesis (including its satisfying the vera causa criterion) and its subsequent verication.
It is, however, impossible to argue that Herschel’s thought on methodology did not inuence
Darwin. We have seen Darwin’s argument unfold in precisely the way that we would expect given a
desire to hold oneself to Herschel’s methodological canons. Darwin begins by proposing a speculative
hypothesis, grounded on an extensive analogical basis. He then sequentially follows Herschel’s steps
for the verication of that hypothesis, rst demonstrating its adequacy and then its ability to account
for a wide variety of phenomena which it was not originally proposed to explain.
While Herschel, then, has multiple responses to Darwin’s theory, the most important of these
ts in neatly with this understanding of the structure of the Origin. In response to the heart of
Darwin’s claim that natural selection is adequate to produce the observed phenomena concerning
the history of life, Herschel states that no theory could be adequate without one crucial piece that
Darwin lacked: a causal understanding of the generation of variations.
Darwin’s relationship to the various currents of inuence in nineteenth-century thought
still remains dicult to elucidate in full detail. Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences may
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well have been inuential late in the development of the Origin, and the arguments put forward
connecting Darwin to German Romanticism are compelling.e inuence of Herschel, supported
both historically and textually, however, is undeniable. All the more devastating must Herschel’s
criticism of Darwin’s theory have been – and primarily criticism on methodological grounds, no
less. Regardless of Herschel’s reaction to Darwin’s work, we can see clearly that Darwin intended to
structure his argument as acceptable by Herschel’s criteria – the criteria of, to reiterate Darwin’s own
characterization, “one of our greatest philosophers.”
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